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Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger have presented a number of argu-
ments suggesting that the Shannon information is not well defined as
a measure of information in quantum mechanics. If established, this
result would be highly significant, as the Shannon information is fun-
damental to the way we think about information not only in classical
but also in quantum information theory. On consideration, however,
these arguments are found unsuccessful; I go on to suggest how they
might be arising as a consequence of Zeilinger’s proposed foundational
principle for quantum mechanics.
2
1 Introduction
What role the concept of information might have to play in the foundations
of quantum mechanics is a question that has recently excited renewed
interest (see e.g., Fuchs 2002; Mermin 2002; Wheeler 1990). Zeilinger, for
example, has put forward an information-theoretic principle which he
suggests might serve as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics
(Zeilinger 1999). As a part of this project, Brukner and Zeilinger (2001)
have criticised the Shannon measure of information (Shannon 1948), the
quantity fundamental to the discussion of information in both classical and
quantum information theory. They claim that the Shannon information is
not appropriate as a measure of information in the quantum context and
have proposed in its stead their own preferred quantity and a notion of
‘total information content’ associated with it, which latter is supposed to
supplant the von Neumann entropy. Their argument takes two forms: first,
that the Shannon information is too intimately tied to classical notions of
measurement to be applicable in quantum mechanics; and second, that it
cannot be used to define an appropriate notion of ‘total information
content’ for quantum systems. I shall argue that neither of these strategies
is successful, concentrating rather more on the latter. I shall then try and
indicate why these arguments against the Shannon information are arising
as a consequence of Zeilinger’s proposed foundational principle for quantum
mechanics.
3
2 Is the Shannon Information inherently
classical?
The Shannon information H(~p) is a measure of uncertainty; it measures the
spread of a probability distribution ~p = {p1, . . . , pn}, quantifying our
uncertainty about what the outcome of an experiment described by this
distribution will be. It takes the following form:
H(~p) = −∑
i
pi log pi. (1)
Brukner and Zeilinger’s first concern is that interpreting H(~p) as a measure
of information would require a pre-existing sequence of possessed values in
a message being decoded, but such a sequence cannot be taken to exist in
general in quantum mechanics. (They consider the example of a string of
systems all prepared in a given state |ψ〉 which is not an eigenstate of the
observable measured.) Their worry here seems misplaced, however. The
possible absence of a pre-existing string of values does not affect the
interpretation of the Shannon information, at least as it is usually
understood.
Two sorts of explanation standardly relate the Shannon quantity to a
notion of information. The first exploits an intuitive link between measures
of uncertainty and information: the greater our uncertainty about the
outcome of an experiment, the more we stand to gain from actually
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performing it. From this point of view, the Shannon information tell us our
expected information gain before we perform an experiment, or our average
gain following many repetitions1. Clearly no pre-existing values are called
for here, all that is required is that the distribution ~p correctly characterise
the experiment in question.
The second link to information follows from Shannon’s 1948 noiseless
coding theorem, which states that H(~p) tells us the maximum amount that
messages drawn from an ensemble characterised by the distribution ~p can
be compressed, and hence indicates the channel resources required to
transmit messages produced by an information source modelled by such an
ensemble. Again there is no requirement that these messages are composed
of fixed pre-existing strings of values. To derive the bound on the optimal
compression, we consider very long strings of values. Then, given the
appropriate probability distribution we know ab initio that any sequence
observed will be one of the typical sequences in which the relative frequency
of any type of outcome matches its probability of occurrence; and this on
its own is sufficient to calculate the number of bits that will be necessary to
specify any string produced, pre-existing or not.
Brukner and Zeilinger’s second reason for concern that the Shannon
information involves problematic classical assumptions is somewhat more
substantial. Shannon’s original presentation included a uniqueness proof for
the form of H(~p) which involved putting forward a number of constraints as
reasonable requirements on a measure of uncertainty. The constraint that
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plays the key role in securing uniqueness is often known as the grouping
axiom and takes the following form in the more rigorous presentation of
Shannon’s argument due to Faddeev (1957):
For every n ≥ 2,
H(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1, q1, q2) = H(p1, . . . , pn−1, pn) + pnH(q1/pn, q2/pn) (2)
where pn = q1 + q2.
Brukner and Zeilinger argue that if we are to understand the physical
content of this axiom then we must refer to the performance of joint
experiments. Thus if we take two experiments A and B with outcomes
a1, . . . , an; b1, . . . , bm respectively, then the grouping axiom relates our
uncertainty for the performance of these distinct experiments. Eqn. (2),
they suggest, will be equivalent to
H(A ∧B) = H(A) +H(B|A), (3)
where H(B|A) = ∑ni=1 p(ai)H(p(b1|ai), . . . , p(bm|ai)).
This, however, seems to make it clear that the grouping axiom embodies a
particularly classical assumption about measurement, namely that
measurements can be made ideally non-disturbing2. Furthermore, it seems
that if we are going to be able to apply the grouping axiom, then we have
to be able to make the assumption that attributes corresponding to all
possible measurements can be assigned to a system simultaneously (in this
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case, ai, bj and ai ∧ bj). But we know this will not be true in general in
quantum mechanics. For non-commuting observables, the probabilities on
the left hand sides of eqns.(2) and (3) will not be defined and the grouping
axiom will fail to hold. Brukner and Zeilinger thus conclude that the
standard uniqueness proof fails in quantum mechanics and that the
Shannon information ceases to be justified as a measure of information as it
is conceptually tied to these classical assumptions in virtue of the grouping
axiom.
The prospects for the Shannon information are not really so bad as this,
however. Failure of the argument for uniqueness and inapplicability of the
grouping axiom need not imply that the Shannon information cannot
function as a measure of uncertainty. The Shannon information is in fact
one of a general class of measures of uncertainty, characterised by a set of
axioms in which the grouping axiom does not appear (Uffink 1990), hence
the grouping axiom is not necessary for the interpretation of the Shannon
information as a measure of uncertainty3 and any classical assumptions
that the axiom might embody would not transfer to the Shannon
information itself.
It can be argued further that Brukner and Zeilinger’s interpretation of the
grouping axiom is not equivalent to the standard form which does not
involve classical assumptions and is equally applicable in the quantum and
classical cases (Timpson 2001). Here, however, I want to note the possibility
that Brukner and Zeilinger’s worry about the Shannon information, as it
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finds expression in their grouping axiom argument, may be due at least in
part to the fact that they seem to desire a measure of information or
uncertainty intrinsic to a quantum system, rather than a measure
associated with particular experiments. (This would explain their emphasis
on non-commuting measurements on an individual system, for example.)
However, if we want a measure of information for a quantum system itself, a
measure of how uncertain we are in general when we know the state of the
system, then it is obvious from the beginning that the Shannon information
is not the correct sort of function for us; and there are other, familiar,
functions that will do the job instead. A measure of uncertainty is a
function of a probability distribution and we know that a joint probability
distribution for all possible measurements does not exist; it is for this reason
that we introduce measures of mixedness such as the von Neumann entropy
which are functions of the state rather than of a probability distribution. It
would be a mistake, however, to take it as a complaint against the Shannon
information that it does not play this very different sort of role. As a
measure of uncertainty it does as much as we could ask of it; we do not
want to confuse the question of what makes a good measure of uncertainty
with the question of when joint probability distributions can be defined.
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3 The Total Information Constraint
Brukner and Zeilinger’s other main argument against the Shannon
information is that it is not appropriately related to a notion of ‘total
information content’ for a quantum system. Here they compare H(~p)




(pi − 1/n)2 , (4)
which they relate to their notion of total information content in the
following way.
A set of measurements is called mutually unbiased if the sets of projectors
{P}, {Q} associated with any pair of measurement bases satisfy
Tr(PQ) = 1/n, where n is the dimensionality of the system; there can exist
at most n+ 1 such bases (Wootters and Fields 1989), constituting a
complete set4. Noting the fact that an unknown state ρ may be completely
determined by measurement of such a complete set on an ensemble of
similarly prepared systems (Ivanovic 1981), Brukner and Zeilinger suggest
that the total information content of a quantum system should be defined
as a sum of individual information measures for a complete set of mutually










= Tr (ρ− 1/n)2 . (5)
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The fact that this quantity is invariant under unitary transformations is
important, because Brukner and Zeilinger also suggest that it is a necessary
constraint on a measure of total information content that it be unitarily
invariant. This is the problem they raise for the Shannon information —
substituting H(~p) in eqn. (5) does not result in a unitarily invariant
quantity. That is, H(~p) fails to satisfy what we might call Brukner and
Zeilinger’s ‘total information constraint’, that a measure of information has
to sum to a unitarily invariant quantity that can be interpreted as a ‘total
information content’ for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements.
The picture is that the Shannon measure is inadequate as a measure of
information gain because it does not satisfy the total information constraint
and hence does not tell us how much of the total information content of a
system we learn by performing measurements in a given basis. Similarly, a
complaint is raised against the von Neumann entropy that it is merely a
measure of mixedness, as unlike Itot, it has no relation to the information
gained in a measurement unless we happen to measure in the eigenbasis of
ρ.
This argument against the Shannon information is only compelling if the
total information constraint is in fact a reasonable constraint on individual
measures of information. Unfortunately, it is not obvious that it is. To
begin with, the ‘information content’ of a quantum state can mean several
different things; we might, for example, be interested in the maximum
amount that can be encoded into a given quantum system (the Holevo
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bound (Holevo 1973)), or in the average amount of information needed to
specify the state of a system drawn from a given ensemble (the classical
information of the source). Since ‘information content’ is not univocal, it
seems difficult to maintain that all meaningful individual information
measures and measures of information content must have the particular
fixed relation expressed in the total information constraint. A further
important consideration is that we may well demand to know why
information measures for a complete set of mutually unbiased
measurements should be expected to sum to a particularly interesting
quantity in any case. To make this question more pointed, let us ask why it
is that I(~p) in fact happens to sum to a unitarily invariant quantity.
I(~p) is not especially novel as a measure of information; it is one of the
general class of measures of the concentration of a probability distribution
given by Uffink (1990). A measure of concentration is the reciprocal of a
measure of uncertainty, increasing as a probability distribution becomes
more peaked. I(~p) is a Schur convex function, rather than a Schur concave
function like H(~p) and measures of uncertainty; it could be said to measure
how well we can predict the outcome of an experiment, rather than how
uncertain we are about it. I(~p), however, has a particular geometric
property as well as being a measure of information; and it is this property,
tangential to its role as a measure of information, which explains the
relation to Itot and how it satisfies the total information constraint. To see
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this, we will use the Hilbert-Schmidt representation of density operators, a
more general form of the familiar Bloch sphere representation.
3.1 The Relation between Total Information Content
and I(~p)
The set of complex n× n Hermitian matrices forms an n2-dimensional real
Hilbert space Vh(C
n) on which we have defined an inner product
(A,B) = Tr(AB);A,B ∈ Vh(Cn) and a norm ‖A‖ =
√
Tr(A2) (Fano 1957;
Wichmann 1963). The density matrix ρ of an n dimensional quantum
system can be represented as a vector in this space. The requirements on ρ
of unit trace and positivity imply that the tip of any such vector must lie in
the n2 − 1 dimensional hyperplane T a distance 1/√n from the origin and
perpendicular to the unit operator 1, and on or within a hypersphere of
radius one centred on the origin.
It is useful to introduce a set of basis operators on our space; we require n2
linearly independent operators Ui ∈ Vh(Cn) and it may be useful to require
orthogonality: Tr(UiUj) = const.× δij. Any operator on the system can






where we have chosen U0 = 1 to take care of the trace condition.
Evidently, ρ may be determined experimentally by finding the expectation
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values of the n2 − 1 operators Ui in the state ρ. If we include the operator 1
in our basis set, then the idempotent projectors associated with
measurement of any maximal (non-degenerate) observable will provide a
maximum of a further n− 1 linearly independent operators. Obtaining the
probability distribution for a given maximal observable will thus provide
n− 1 of the parameters required to determine the state, and the minimum
number of measurements of maximal observables that will be needed in
total is n+ 1, if each observable provides a full complement of linearly
independent projectors.
Each such set of projectors spans an n− 1 dimensional hyperplane in
Vh(C
n) and their expectation values specify the projection of the state ρ
into this hyperplane. Ivanovic (1981) noted that projectors P,Q belonging
to any two different mutually unbiased bases will be orthogonal in T, hence
the hyperplanes associated with measurement of mutually unbiased
observables are orthogonal in the space in which density operators are
constrained to lie in virtue of the trace condition. If n+ 1 mutually
unbiased observables can be found, then, Vh(C
n) can be decomposed into
orthogonal subspaces given by the one dimensional subspace spanned by 1
and the n+ 1 subspaces associated with the mutually unbiased observables.










where P¯ ji = P
j
i − 1/n is the projection onto T of the ith idempotent
projector in the jth mutually unbiased basis set, and qji = (p
j
i − 1/n) is the
expectation value of this operator in the state ρ. For a given value of j, the
vectors P¯i span an (n− 1) dimensional orthogonal subspace and the square







It is then simple to see that I(~p) satisfies the total information constraint
because these squared lengths of the components of ρ in orthogonal spaces
can just be added to get the length squared of ρ in T, i.e. the square of the
distance of ρ from the maximally mixed state Tr(ρ− 1/n)2 = Itot; and this
is what eqn. (5) reports.
Thus I(~p) satisfies the total information constraint because it has the
particular geometrical property of measuring a length. The question now is,
would H(~p) have to be a measure of length in order to be a measure of
information? That is, does it suffer from not satisfying the total information
constraint? The short answer is no — H(~p) can be a perfectly good
measure of information without having to be a measure of the length of the
projection of ρ into the subspace associated with an observable. The longer
answer involves pointing out that when considered strictly as measures of
information, I(~p) and H(~p) function in much the same way; and in fact, as
measures of information, H(~p) stands to S(ρ), the von Neumann entropy, in
the same relation as I(~p) stands to Itot, as we shall now see.
Brukner and Zeilinger’s total information content Itot seems best
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interpreted as a measure of mixedness, a measure of how much we know in
general about what the outcomes of experiments will be given the state
(Brukner and Zeilinger 1999b). The functioning of measures of mixedness
can usefully be approached via the notions of majorization and Schur
convexity (concavity). The majorization relation ≺ imposes a pre-order on
probability distributions (Uffink 1990; Nielsen 2001). A probability
distribution ~q is majorized by ~p, ~q ≺ ~p, iff qi = ∑j Sijpj, where Sij is a
doubly stochastic matrix. That is (via Birkhoff’s theorem), if ~q is a mixture
of permutations of ~p. Thus if ~q ≺ ~p, then ~q is a more mixed or disordered
distribution than ~p.
Schur convex (concave) functions respect the ordering of the majorization
relation: a function f is Schur convex if, if ~q ≺ ~p then f(~q) ≤ f(~p), and
Schur concave if, if ~q ≺ ~p then f(~q) ≥ f(~p) (for strictly Schur convex(cave)
functions, equality holds only if ~q and ~p are permutations of one another).
This explains the utility of such functions as measures of the concentration
and uncertainty of probability distributions, respectively. Now, it can be
shown (Nielsen 2001) that the probability distribution ~p for the outcomes of
any projective measurement is majorized by the vector of eigenvalues ~λ of
the pre-measurement state ρ. This entails that S(ρ) is the infimum of H(~p),
H(~p) ≥ S(ρ) (since H(~p) is Schur concave), and Itot is the supremum of
I(~p), I(~p) ≤ Itot (I(~p) Schur convex); both inequalities reflecting the same
fact from the theory of majorization. These relations illustrate why a
measure of mixedness is a measure of how much we know given the state:
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the more mixed a state, the more uncertain we must be about the outcome
of any given measurement. However, they also make it clear that S(ρ) does
have an explicit relation to the information gain from measurement that
would justify its interpretation as a total information content. Conversely,
they establish that H(~p) does have an appropriate relation to a measure of
information content, despite not satisfying the total information constraint;
the same relation, in fact, that I(~p) has to its associated notion of
information content, up to an irrelevant change in sign. We must conclude
that the total information constraint is not a reasonable requirement on
measures of information; the Shannon information survives Brukner and
Zeilinger’s final argument unscathed.
4 Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle
We have seen that Brukner and Zeilinger’s worries about the applicability
of the Shannon information are misplaced; the Shannon information is
perfectly well defined and meaningful as a measure of information in
quantum mechanics. I want now to suggest that these worries may have
arisen in the first place as a consequence of a proposed foundational
principle for quantum mechanics.
Zeilinger (1999) puts forward the following principle as a possible
foundation for the whole of quantum theory. Two formulations of the
Principle are presented:
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FP1) An elementary system represents the truth value of one proposition.
FP2) An elementary system carries one bit of information.
Brukner and Zeilinger claim that this Principle can explain, amongst other
things, the irreducible randomness of quantum measurement and the
phenomenon of entanglement.
It is not immediately obvious that FP1 and FP2 are actually equivalent,
neither is it clear how the Foundational Principle might in fact be supposed
to function. As it stands it does not appear to distinguish between classical
and quantum; FP1 and FP2 seem to be as true of a single classical (Ising
model) spin as of a qubit. Unfortunately, space does not allow us to discuss
properly the prospects for the Foundational Principle as a foundational
principle here (see Timpson (2001)), we shall have to rest content with
trying to become a little clearer on what it actually means. To this end, we
need to discuss Zeilinger’s conception of the quantum state and to elaborate
what he means by a system ‘carrying’, or ‘representing’ information.
Zeilinger adopts an explicitly instrumentalist view of the quantum state:
The initial state...represents all our information as obtained by
earlier observation...[the time evolved] state is just a short hand
way of representing the outcomes of all possible future
observations.(Zeilinger 1999, 634)
Such instrumentalist sentiments are common. Where Brukner and Zeilinger
depart from the norm, however, is in adopting a very literal construal of the
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information taken to constitute the state, by adopting, at least inchoately,
the Hilbert-Schmidt representation of states:
We describe a photon by a catalog of information (“information
vector”) ~i = (i1, i2) about mutually complementary propositions
{P1,P2}. Such propositions are, for example, P1: “the
polarization of the photon is vertical (horizontal)” (Brukner and
Zeilinger 1999a)
The component i1 is defined as (p− q), where p and q are the probabilities
for vertical and horizontal polarization respectively5. Thus, the components
of the information vector ~i correspond, effectively, to the coefficients qji in
eqn. (6), and the propositions P to the operators P¯ ji .
On this conception, an amount of information in the form of probabilities
has been associated to propositions representing the outcomes of mutually
unbiased measurements; the information and the experimental propositions
it is about can be read off directly from the Hilbert-Schmidt representation
of the state, given some choice of basis operators (choice of complete set of
mutually unbiased measurements). Illustrating the general idea, if
probability 1 is associated to some proposition, then the state says the
maximum possible about the outcome of the measurement with which that
proposition is associated; if there is a flat distribution for outcomes of a
measurement, the state contains no information about it. In general the
state will contain partial information about a number of mutually unbiased
observables. Endorsing the instrumentalist line, all that the state is is an
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amount of information in this way about mutually complementary
observables.
Now the statements FP1 and FP2 refer to an elementary system carrying
or representing an amount of information. By this, Zeilinger says, he means
the following:
...that a system “represents” the truth value of a proposition or
that it “carries” one bit of information only implies a statement
concerning what can be said about possible measurement
results. (Zeilinger 1999, 635)
Thus rather than, for example, being a restriction on how much
information might be encoded into, or read from, a physical system, we see
that the Foundational Principle is a restriction on how much can be said
about measurement outcomes, and hence, in particular, is a restriction on
how much the state can say about measurement outcomes. For Zeilinger,
the state will in general be constituted by amounts of partial information
about measurement outcomes. The Foundational Principle requires that
the state can only contain a limited amount of information, namely one bit;
hence it follows that the amounts of partial information contained in the
state, although how these are to be quantified has not yet been specified in
detail, must add up to one bit’s worth in total.
This, however, rules out the Shannon information as the measure of the
amount ‘carried’ by the state about a given measurement; we know that in
general we will not have a sum to unity for amounts of partial information
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conceived in the way outlined. (As H(~p) does not sum to a unitarily
invariant quantity for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements,
we cannot guarantee that we will attain the value of one for any given pure
state.)
Thus the conjunction of the Foundational Principle with Brukner and
Zeilinger’s brand of literal instrumentalism about the quantum state is
inconsistent with adopting the Shannon information to measure the amount
of information ‘carried’ about a measurement. I suggest that it is this fact
that tempts Brukner and Zeilinger to argue, unsuccessfully as it turns out,
that the Shannon information is not the correct measure of information and
cannot be applied in quantum mechanics.
We close with two final comments. First, consider what someone rather
more realist about the quantum state might make of the Foundational
Principle. Here the information idiom would no longer be particularly
enticing and a more precise statement of what is being expressed by the
Foundational Principle would be natural:
‘R’ FP) Any projective measurement other than in the
eigenbasis of ρ results in a shorter vector in Vh(C
n)
(‘R’ FP for ‘realist’ Foundational Principle.) That is, any such measurement
would result in a more spread probability distribution; if we began with a
pure state then post- (non-selective) measurement, the ensemble will no
longer be represented by a one-dimensional projector. Given this statement
of the Principle, we see that it is a matter of choice whether or not, or with
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which quantities, we chose to discuss the uncertainties associated with the
probability distributions generated by the state.
Second, we might wonder whether the foregoing indicates that for the
instrumentalist at least, I(~p) does after all represent the ‘correct’ measure
of information in quantum mechanics. Such a choice would appear very
artificial given the close relation between the functioning of I(~p) and H(~p)
discussed earlier. Note, however, that one could still be an instrumentalist
about the quantum state while adopting ‘R’FP as more genuinely
informative than FP1 and FP2. The instrumentalist is not, then, forced to
accept I(~p) as the only correct measure of information in quantum
mechanics.
So, to conclude: we have seen that Brukner and Zeilinger’s arguments
against the applicability of the Shannon information in quantum mechanics
are unsuccessful; and we have seen, moreover, that these arguments seem to
be motivated by the conjunction of Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle with
a particular form of instrumentalism about the quantum state. Even if one
has instrumentalist leanings, however, this does not imply that the
Brukner-Zeilinger measure can be the only correct measure of information
in quantum mechanics. The Shannon information remains perfectly well
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Notes
1H(~p) actually takes the form of an expectation value of a function,
− log pi, that decreases the more likely an outcome is.
2Eqn. (3) can be read as saying that if we first perform A and then B,
our uncertainty in B can just be updated conditional on the A outcome, our
ability to predict B values not being degraded by the A measurement.
3Uffink (1990, §1.6.3) argues further that the grouping axiom is not a
natural constraint on a measure of information, even in the classical case, and
should not be insisted upon as a necessary constraint, pace Jaynes (1957).
4For the n = 2 case, the three spatially orthogonal components of spin
constitute a familiar example of a complete set of mutually unbiased observ-
ables.
5For this two-dimensional quantum system, we have here, essentially, the
Bloch sphere representation.
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